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INTRODUCTION
Two separate and distinct movements have colonized research in the
field of intellectual property. The law and economics movement has
deepened our understanding of the justification for granting monopoly
rights over intellectual property; in more recent years, theories in the
movement have been used to support the growth of the commons—the
free environment where intellectual property plays little role in
generating new creative works and innovation. The second movement
is the law and technology movement that has sought to increase
understanding of intellectual property through the exploration of how
technologies either provide freedoms or impose limitations on how
creative works and innovation are created and received by society.
The advent of the information age and the infiltration of the Internet
into our homes have allowed the ordinary citizen to participate in the
process of creating new literary and artistic works and distributing those
works across channels opened by new technologies. Scientific research
takes on a completely different meaning as new technologies allow
DNA sequences to be analyzed through complex three-dimensional
1
computer generated models.
This movement has increased our
understanding of the legal dimensions of new technologies and the
effect these technologies have on society, whether in real life or online.
The impact of these two movements on many fields of law has increased
our understanding of the law of intellectual property and its effect on
society. One thing is clear from the literature: a balance must be
achieved between incentives to produce for the creator of a work and
access to information, knowledge, and content by the users.
Applied to copyright law, the combined jurisprudence of law and
economics and law and technology provides insight into addressing the
balance between private rights and public interest. The main issue
facing copyright law—the extent to which public access to creative
works may be the underlying rationale for the imposition of limitations
upon the reach of copyright law, particularly in an age where access to
information and knowledge is facilitated by technology—arises from
constitutional intent. As outlined in the U.S. Constitution, authors are
2
to have exclusive rights to their writings to promote the progress of arts.

1. See Richard Wright, Computer Graphics as Allegorical Knowledge: Electronic
Imagery in the Sciences, 3 LEONARDO (SUPP. ISSUE) 65 (1990).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8. The U.S. Constitution gives “Congress . . . [the]
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
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Implicit in this is the notion that the ultimate aim of the grant of
3
monopoly rights is the progress of arts for the greater benefit of society.
One historical underpinning of the development of copyright law was to
4
encourage learning —this was done by rewarding authors for using their
5
talents to the ultimate benefit of the public. The grant of the copyright
monopoly was the most efficient way to enhance pubic welfare through
6
the works of authors.
Law and economics jurisprudence does not provide compelling
arguments to support the notion that the copyright monopoly is the
most efficient way to maximize public welfare by promoting the works
of authors. In fact, Justice Stephen Breyer, in his tenure piece at
Harvard Law School, entitled The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study
7
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, argues
that the economic justification for granting rights to authors to
8
encourage authorship cannot be proven. However, economic theories
Id.
3. MELVILLE B. NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND
OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION: INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION,
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 30 (6th ed. 2000).
The authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright
is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative
activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the
full realization of such creative activities. Implicit in this rationale is the assumption
that in the absence of such public benefit the grant of a copyright monopoly to
individuals would be unjustified.
Id.
4. The Statute of Anne, the first copyright law, was enacted as “[a]n Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.”
Act for the
Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
5. Chief Justice Hughes identified the primary purpose for the grant of a copyright
monopoly as residing “in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.” Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). A copyright serves as both “the
equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skills
of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.” Id. at 127–
28.
6. The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein alluded to this point and stated that “[t]he
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954).
7. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
8. Id. at 322. Professor Breyer, as he then was, argued that exclusive rights under
copyright only minimally contributed toward increasing the volume of literary production,
especially of books. Id. at 283–84.
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regarding the creation of market externalities, the causes for market
failures, and the correction of market inefficiencies provide evidence in
support of retaining the copyright system as the means of correcting
9
these market failures and inefficiencies and to encourage authorship.
The theories suggest the need for copyright law to achieve the balance
between private rights and public welfare as well as individual rights and
collective freedoms in situations where the market for information
10
goods is certainly going to be inefficient. More importantly, these
11
theories identify copyright’s role in correcting market inefficiencies.
The law’s expansion in the last three decades has had no adverse effect
on public welfare because the expansion of the law has not imposed
12
additional social costs. The social cost from the expansion of these
private rights is nonexistent because market structures change as
technologies develop, providing society with increased accessibility to
13
creative works. Copyright laws must expand as technology develops to
achieve a fair balance between private rights and public interests.

9. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–12 (1982).
Professor Wendy Gordon explains that “[e]conomists ordinarily characterize intellectual
property law as an effort to cure a form of market failure stemming from the presence of
‘public goods’ characteristics.” Id. at 1610. There are two characteristics that define public
goods: (1) they are non-rivalrous in that one person’s consumption of the good does not
reduce another person’s ability to consume the good, and (2) they are nonexclusive in that it
is not possible for any one consumer to exclude others from consuming the good. These
characteristics of public goods would cause them to be underproduced if left to the private
market because free riding will occur. According to Professor Gordon, copyright law allows a
market for intellectual property to function by providing a means to exclude non-purchasers
through the special property rights that authors have to sell physical copies of their works
while retaining legal control over certain uses of the works. See id. at 1610–12.
10. Id. at 1612–13. Professor Gordon explains that copyright law allows consensual
market transfers to take place through the copyright notice requirement, registration system,
criminal sanctions, and statutory damages provisions. Id. Consensual markets for
copyrighted goods are facilitated in four ways through the law: property rights, lower
transaction costs, provision of valuable information, and mechanisms of enforcement.
11. Id. at 1626. Professor Gordon argues that fair use is an appropriate judicial
response to market failures when consensual bargains cannot effectively occur between the
copyright holder and user of the work. Id. at 1627–35. The market for literary and artistic
works may breakdown through the creation of market barriers as a result of new
technologies, the presence of externalities, non-monetary interests, and noncommercial
activities as well as anti-dissemination motives to control the flow of information.
12. See J. Miles Hanisee, Comment, An Economic View of Innovation and Property
Right Protection in the Expanded Regulatory State, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 127, 158–59 (1993).
Rather, the expansion of the law was necessary to allow technological progression to occur.
A system of compensation for the risks involved in developing new technologies should be
undertaken by society to ensure continuous technological advancement.
13. Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
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In recent years, law and technology literature has demonstrated that
other factors should be taken into account in making a case for
copyright law, and one of these factors is the role technology plays in
shifting the balance of control of creative works from authors to users.
Users are greatly empowered by digital technologies to reuse and
rebuild creative works, and the use of technology may strategically alter
how works are created and used. In Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace, Professor Lawrence Lessig argues that architecture built
into the Internet may provide perfect control over activities that occur
14
online through the use of codes. Codes give authors the opportunity to
control the use of their intellectual property independent of copyright
15
law. One example of these codes is a trusted system that provides
creators of creative works maximum control over how their works are
16
used when these works are made available online.
The use of
technology can further restrict society’s use of free ideas from common
resources. Content on the Internet, for example, can be controlled
through the use of technology by copyright owners in such a way that
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 25 (2004).
[N]o matter how revolutionary technological advancements may be, the laws of
supply and demand and the theoretical framework of external effects apply to
technological change in the same manner they do to any other shift in relative costs
caused by exogenous changes. . . . In the context of cyberspace, intellectual property
law allows content providers to internalize the commercial strategy between
authored works and new technological means of distribution and presentation of
information.
Id. According to Professor Depoorter, “[d]igital technologies ‘break through the functional
rigidities of print media by providing users with extraction tools . . . to sort and arrange data
in ways meaningful to them.’ Modern technology can turn incoherent data into meaningful
and valuable information.” Id. at 27 (quoting J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 65 (1997)).
14. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).
According to Professor Lessig,
[i]n real space we recognize how laws regulate—through constitutions, statutes and
other legal codes. In cyberspace we must understand how code regulates—how the
software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is.
As William Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s “law.”
Id.
15. See id. at 135.
16. See id.
Trusted systems regulate in the same domain where copyright law regulates, but
unlike copyright law, they do not guarantee the same public use protection. Trusted
systems give the producer maximum control—admittedly at a cheaper cost, thus
permitting many more authors to publish. But they give authors more control
(either to charge for or limit use) in an area where the law gave less than perfect
control.
Id.
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creativity and innovation cannot freely occur. Our ability to build and
shape our culture may also be affected as technology develops to
provide creators with the ability to control how content is used and
18
decide the sort of content that we receive as a society. The capacity
that technologies provide to authors of creative works to displace the
balance of copyright law and shape how works are used by society
evidences that the balance intended to be achieved through copyright
19
law is lost. This Article considers the effect of technology on the
accessibility of creative works and suggests that such effects provide
many reasons to look to copyright law to provide a balance between
private rights and public interests that would not ordinarily exist without
such a system.
For purposes of analysis, these theories are applied in the context of
a relatable example. In a novel about hobbits, goblins, and fantasy,
entitled The Hobbit, J.R.R. Tolkien conceived of the idea for a greater
20
work that would draw on the foundation of all his previous works.
This idea was realized in the creation of Tolkien’s greatest work, The
21
Lord of the Rings, which was built upon his many smaller works. The
22
23
novel’s adaptation into three blockbuster films, a soundtrack, and a

17. According to Professor Lessig, the Internet makes two things possible. First,
through the deployment of proper codes, it is possible “to control the use of copyrighted
material much more fully than was possible before the Internet.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 200 (2001).
Second, the concentration of media power is threatened by the availability of new
technologies over the Internet that open up new channels for production and distribution of
content. See id.
18. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 173 (2004).
In response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the
Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and distributing
culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way that will undermine
our tradition of free culture. The property right that is copyright is no longer the
balanced right that it was, or intended to be.
Id.
19. Id. at 172–73.
20. MICHAEL WHITE, TOLKIEN: A BIOGRAPHY 147 (2001).
21. Id. at 183.
22. See Official Lord of the Rings Movie Homepage, http://www.lordoftherings.net/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
23. See The Lord of the Rings: The Complete Recordings, http://www.lordoftheringssoundtrack.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). For a complete review and analysis of the
soundtrack, see Lord of the Rings Soundtrack Analysis and Review, http://www.lotrsound
track.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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24

video game illustrates the entire spectrum of copyright’s empire and
the balance that must be achieved between private rights and the public
interest.
More importantly, Tolkien’s success demonstrates the
economic incentives that drive the production of creative works.
Producers of creative works rely on property rights as a surety that their
investments in producing works are recovered. Thus, one could
conclude the following: law and economic jurisprudence evidences that
the social cost of the grant of intellectual property rights to creators is
always dependent on the benefit that accrues to society to enjoy the
works as new technologies develop. The expansion of rights should be
allowed if the impact of the expanded rights on society is marginal. Law
and technology jurisprudence has shown that technology can always be
25
used to displace the balance that copyright law seeks to achieve. In
order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts,”
authors and inventors must be given exclusive rights in “their respective
26
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.” Private rights ordering alone will not
achieve the balance between private rights and the public interest. In
conclusion, this author argues that copyright’s empire—the institution
that is intended to encourage authorship to ultimately serve the public
interest—must be built upon a firm foundation of law. It is only through
law that the proper conditions for authorship can exist for the ultimate
benefit of society.
I. LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS IN COPYRIGHT
The traditional justification for copyright law, based on law and
economics reasoning, relies upon the rationale that a temporary
monopoly right is necessary to encourage authorship to ultimately
27
benefit society as a whole. The grant of a temporary monopoly over
literary and artistic works serves a utilitarian purpose to “stimulate
production of the widest possible variety of creative goods at the lowest
28
possible price.” The first copyright statute, enacted in England in 1710
to put an end to the booksellers’ monopoly over the book trade,

24. See The Lord of the Rings Online: Shadows of Angmar, http://lotro.turbine.com/
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
25. LESSIG, supra note 18, at 173.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,
127–28 (1932).
28. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND
PRACTICE 3 (2001).
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29

displays this early thread of utilitarianism in copyright law.
The
Statute of Anne, enacted as an “[a]ct for the encouragement of learning,
by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of
such copies, during the times therein mentioned,” forms the historical
30
basis for most copyright legislation in common law countries. The
utilitarian basis for copyright protection is also evident in the U.S.
Constitution, which grants Congress the authority to enact legislation to
afford authors exclusive rights in their works in order to promote the
31
greater good of progress in arts and sciences. The enactment of the
first copyright legislation in the United States in 1790, indeed, reflects
this intent to promote general societal development, and outlines the
purpose of the enactment as being “for the encouragement of learning
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and
32
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”
The development of the law of intellectual property has given
scholars and practitioners a reason to further understand and increase
scholarship in the field. The law of real property has been used to
justify the intellectual property owner’s right to exclude society from
33
using the work without prior permission. The economics behind this
right to exclude are effectuated by allowing the creator of a work to
recover investments made in producing the work. In this way, creators
of intellectual property are allowed to recover the benefits that society
receives from the creation of the work by exercising the exclusive rights
that the authors have as a result of their intellectual property rights.
Professor Edmund Kitch has observed that one oversight that many
scholars and commentators make about the right to exclude society
from using a protected work in ways that have not been permitted by
the right owner is that protection of intellectual property rights may
29. Id. at 5–6.
30. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 28, at 3. According to Professor Goldstein, “the ideal copyright legislator will test
every proposal to extend copyright against the criterion of utility and will vote for the
proposed extension only if it is demonstrably necessary to stimulate the creation of new
works.” GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3.
31. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 6 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
32. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831).
33. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 484–95 (2003). In this article, the authors argue that economic justifications
for recognizing property rights in public goods apply equally to intellectual property to
prevent diminishing value in a work and encourage continued investments in marketing,
developing, and renewing works. See generally id. Property rights are necessary in
intellectual property to prevent the inefficiencies that would occur from overuse of goods that
are freely available and accessible to the public.
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provide the right owner with an economic monopoly over the work.
Monopolies over works, however, are separate and distinct from
35
property rights in works. A right to exclude others from using the
work is not the same as an economic monopoly to control competition
36
in a free market place.
Professor Kitch is correct to the extent that the use of the term
“monopoly” to describe the control an intellectual property right owner
has over the work suggests a market for content that has only one
producer or seller. For copyrighted works, use of the term monopoly
conveys the ability of an individual copyright producer to exclude
market competition by the sole fact that the copyright owner becomes
the market for the good and is in complete control of the amount of
37
output of content offered for sale to the public. However, for content,
the market is significantly different because competition may enter a
market with a product developed from the idea underlying the original
38
work.
The markets for literary and artistic works rarely produce
monopolies in the economic sense because competitors are free to

34. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (2000).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1734–36.
From an economic point of view, “property” and “monopoly” have almost nothing
to do with each other. A seller who owns his wares has property but no monopoly if
many other people independently sell similar things in the same market. A seller
who can control the price of what he sells, because no one seriously competes with
him in the market, has a monopoly but not property if he does not own what he
sells.
Id. at 1735 (quoting S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
53 (Comm. Print 1958)).
37. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 328 (5th ed.
2001). According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld, “[i]f the monopolist decides to raise the price of
the product, it need not worry about competitors who, by charging lower prices, would
capture a larger share of the market at the monopolist’s expense. The monopolist is the
market and completely controls the amount of output offered for sale.” Id.
38. The U.S. Copyright Act states that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). In Mazer v. Stein, for
example, the Supreme Court decided that a copyright existed in statuettes but not in the idea
of using the statuette as a base for a table lamp. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). In
Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court decided that copyright protected an author’s explanation
for a bookkeeping method but not the method, itself. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104
(1879). In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided that a copyright in a play did not extend to the underlying ideas and themes of the
play. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
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create competing products with the same underlying features. A
“monopoly” over works of intellectual property is, therefore, more
commonly understood to convey control over works or some property
rights in the works, themselves—that is, rights that enable owners to
define the scope of the rights and prevent society from using the works.
The recognition of property rights in works is granted to exclude
others from an overuse of intellectual resources and to internalize
market externalities. The most often cited work to support a theory of
property in this field is Garrett Hardin’s 1968 paper, entitled The
39
Tragedy of the Commons. Hardin argues that common pastures are
40
prone to overuse. Where a village’s common green is available for the
feeding of all the village livestock, each additional livestock that is
added to the commons creates an additional cost that the entire village
41
bears. If each livestock owner acts only according to his or her own
immediate best interests and adds livestock to the commons, an
inevitable tragedy occurs as the commons becomes increasingly
42
overgrazed and is no longer able to support livestock. As a result of
43
this tragedy of the commons, the village faces a disaster.
The same reasoning has been applied in the context of intellectual
property. Information goods are available for all to use and are
common to society, but information is prone to overuse. Unless fences
are erected, common resources, such as information, will be depleted in
precisely the same manner that common pastures are overgrazed.
The tragedy of the commons in an economic sense is the presence of
externalities in a given market. Where production and consumption
activities are not directly reflected in the market, externalities occur; as
a result, the prices of goods do not reflect their actual social value.
Accordingly, firms may produce too much or too little, creating market
inefficiencies.
Property law allows market externalities to be
internalized by the producer and allows the costs and benefits of
activities to be reflected in the price of goods and transferred to the
44
purchasers.
39. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
40. Id. at 1244.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217,
234. Professor Hardy discusses an argument set forth by Professor Harold Demsetz that
property rights arise when “it is a cost-effective way for land users to internalize the costs and
benefits of the use of the land.” Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
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Professor Mark Lemley argues that rights in intellectual property are
being construed as forms of real property rights because real property
rhetoric provides a strong case for exclusive rights to protectors of
45
intellectual property.
The rhetoric of real property in intellectual
property law emphasizes that private ownership is necessary to prevent
market externalities from occurring and allows fences to be built around
46
intellectual property as a solution to the tragedy of the commons.
Relying on Professor Harold Demsetz’s work, Professor Lemley
suggests that property rights may be used to limit negative externalities
arising from transactions in the market; when the costs of these negative
externalities become sufficiently high, the costs of introducing property
47
rights into the market are justified. Professor Lemley goes on to argue
that the application of the exclusionary right in real property to
intellectual property has led the courts and commentators to argue that
free riding—unjustly benefiting from the investment that intellectual
property owners make in producing the work or invention—must be
48
wrong and, therefore, must be removed from the system. Protectors of
strong intellectual property rights argue that, when society is allowed to
free ride on an invention or work, intellectual property owners will not
invest sufficient resources in developing the invention or work because

Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967)); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (1990). Professor Wendy Gordon applies this reasoning to
copyright; she speaks about the incentive to create and identifies copyright law as serving to
provide these incentives to create. Gordon, supra, at 1048–49. Professor Gordon explains
that a creator “is to be encouraged to produce by being given a right to capture a portion of
the benefits he creates.” Id. at 1048. The law should allow those who contribute to cultural
development to find incentives to create and, where the person who contributes most is a
“creative copyist,” copyright law should reward that effort “by giving them a copyright in
their derivative works.” Id. at 1049.
45. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1037–38 (2005).
46. Id. at 1032.
47. Id. at 1037–38.
In his classic work on the economics of property rights, Harold Demsetz argued that
property rights are valuable in a society because they limit the creation of
uncompensated externalities. In a world without transaction costs, Demsetz argued,
the creation of a clear property right will internalize the costs and benefits of an
activity in the owner and permit the sale of that right to others who may value it
more. Once transaction costs are taken into account, Demsetz believed that the
creation or alteration of property rights could be explained by asking whether the
social gains from internalizing an externality exceeded the costs of doing so.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. Id. at 1032.
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they are not allowed to capture the full social benefit of the invention.
The property rights in intellectual property must be strong enough that
the social value of the invention or work does not exceed the private
50
value to the creator of intellectual property.
Within the realm of copyright law, Professor Lemley’s arguments
are particularly applicable. Professor Lemley is correct to suggest that
owners of intellectual property rights should not be entitled to capture
the full social value of their works because it is impossible to fully
51
internalize positive externalities in the marketplace.
Full
internalization of externalities is only as necessary as it is to recover the
52
investment made. The tragedy of the commons does not happen in the
53
realm of copyright where the market is one for information goods, a
54
An
pure public good that is nonexclusive and non-rivalrous.
intellectual property owner cannot easily exclude others from benefiting
from the work, and one person’s use of the work does not affect another
person’s use. And as Professor Lemley outlines, there are also severe
55
costs to the grant of intellectual property rights.
This Article endeavors to build upon the work of Professor Lemley
and argues that, for copyright law, it is not only impossible to internalize
positive externalities in the market, but it is also harmful to allow for a
complete recovery of consumer surplus. Market inefficiencies and
market failures should be an expected state of affairs for copyrighted
works given that positive externalities are not reflected in the price for
56
copyrighted works. As the markets for literary and artistic works are

49. Id. at 1031.
50. See id. at 1039–41.
51. Id. at 1046–47, 1061–64.
52. Id. at 1049–50.
53. Id. at 1050–51.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1058–59.
These costs fall into five categories. First, intellectual property rights distort
markets away from the competitive norm, and therefore create static inefficiencies
in the form of deadweight losses. Second, intellectual property rights interfere with
the ability of other creators to work, and therefore create dynamic inefficiencies.
Third, the prospect of intellectual property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior
that is socially wasteful. Fourth, enforcement of intellectual property rights imposes
administrative costs. Finally, overinvestment in research and development is itself
distortionary.
Id.
56. Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 275–76 (1989) (discussing externalities that accompany
public goods). Professor Palmer explains that public goods are non-rivalrous and
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in most circumstances inefficient and because the existence of market
57
externalities is a source for market failures, institutional intervention
through copyright law is necessary to correct these inefficiencies and to
set conditions where authorship and creativity can occur.
A. Positive Externalities in Markets for Information Goods
In the market for information goods, externalities occur when the
production or consumption of literary and artistic works is not directly
58
reflected in the market. Actions by producers and consumers of such
works affect other copyright producers and consumers, but this is not
59
accounted for in market prices. The presence of positive externalities,
where society benefits from the production and consumption of a work,

nonexclusive and “each person has an incentive to ‘free-ride’ off of the contributions toward
the purchase of the good made by others.” Id. at 275.
Being a public good means that the production of ideal objects entails the
creation of external effects. My act of publishing or in some other way revealing an
idea, for instance, means that that ideal object is appropriable by any and all who
wish to think it. They receive positive externalities from my act.
Id. at 276.
57. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1613.
Copyright markets will not, however, always function adequately. Though the
copyright law provided a means for excluding nonpurchasers and thus has attempted
to cure the public goods problem, and though it has provided mechanisms to
facilitate consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be exceedingly expensive or
it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against non-purchasers, or other market
flaws might preclude achievement of desirable consensual exchanges. In those
cases, the market cannot be relied on to mediate public interests in dissemination
and private interests in remuneration. In extreme instances, Congress may correct
for market distortions by imposing a regulatory solution such as a compulsory
licensing scheme.
Id.
58. New technologies, for example, create new opportunities to use copyrighted works,
which may not have been anticipated by the author or creator of the work, when the work
was first introduced into the market. When novel uses of a work by the public become
“widespread and more visible,” it creates “substantial opportunity costs to producers” in that
there are external gains to society that were not initially anticipated, which are, therefore,
“gains to be internalized.” Depoorter, supra note 13, at 35. Litigation and lobbying for an
extension of copyright law provides the creator of a copyrighted work with the formalities
needed to capture the external social gains. See id.
59. Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 IND. L.J. 851,
853–54 (2006). According to Professor Durham, consumers have certain property rights from
the purchase of a work, such as the right to sell, lend, or dispose of the work. Id. Consumers
also have a greater ability to modify works in their homes undetected, due to the facilitation
of new technologies. When consumer rights are involved, other questions of “privacy,
individual autonomy, and the privileges of ownership associated with physical property,”
beyond an author’s right to be remunerated, become important. Id. at 854.
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is a given condition of the market for intellectual goods.
The
investment made in producing a movie creates private benefits to the
movie producer, and, when marketed, the firm can earn a large profit to
61
cover the cost of investment in producing a movie. However, the
movie is also available to the public for enjoyment and viewing—
benefits that society will enjoy freely in the form of a positive
62
externality.
For purposes of further analysis, it is instructive to return to the
earlier cited example of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings. The English
writer, scholar, and philologist J.R.R. Tolkien wrote The Lord of the
63
Rings and published his work in 1954 and 1955. By 2001, The Lord of
the Rings had “sold over 52 million copies worldwide and ha[d] been
64
translated into twenty-five different languages.”

60. See Palmer, supra note 56, at 275 (explaining that it is neither possible nor efficient
for a producer of public goods to exclude non-purchasing consumers). Professor Palmer
explains that for “a good for which the marginal cost of exclusion is greater than the marginal
cost of provision, it is inefficient to expend resources to exclude non-purchasers.” Id. at 275.
61. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 417 (1980).
Justice Goettel indicates that “[a]ll of the major motion picture producers . . . are engaged in
interstate commerce, receive annual rentals for their films in the hundreds of millions of
dollars, and derive revenues from pay television of many millions of dollars.” Id.
62. The enjoyment that the public receives from seeing movies is a form of positive
externality, like the enjoyment of a newly painted house or newly planted flowers. Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 917, 966 (2005).
The value of public goods is realized upon consumption. That is, upon obtaining
access to a public good, a person consumes it and accrues benefits (value or utility).
The production of public goods has the potential to generate positive externalities.
Whether the benefits are external to production depends upon the conditions of
access and the degree to which the producer internalizes the value realized by others
upon consumption. For example, consider a flower garden. A person who plants
flowers in his front yard creates the potential for positive externalities that may be
realized by those who walk by and appreciate their beauty. The view of the flowers
is non-rival; consumption by one person does not deplete the view or beauty
available for others to consume. Consumption depends upon access, however, and
the realization of potential externalities depends upon whether the homeowner
builds a fence that effectively obstructs the public view. If the homeowner builds an
effective fence, then he has restricted access and the potential for positive
externalities remain untapped. If, on the other hand, the homeowner does not build
such a fence, then people who pass by obtain access to the view, consume it, and
realize external benefits.
Id.
63. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 196, 199, 262.
64. Biography for J.R.R. Tolkien, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0866058/bio (last
visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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The measure of the private benefit (D) to Tolkien from the sales of
his novel is reflected in the cumulative price of the fifty-two million
copies of the novel sold. The novel also created positive externalities in
the form of external benefits (EB) not reflected in the price of the
novel, including the readers’ enjoyment of the adventures of hobbits,
wizards, dwarves, and magicians while reading the novel. The social
benefit (SB) of the novel is the sum of the private benefit accruing to
Tolkien and the external benefit accruing to the readers of the novel:
SB = D + EB.
From 2001 to 2003, the novel was dramatized into three film parts:
The Fellowship of the Ring (2001), The Two Towers (2002), and The
65
Return of the King (2003). The total cost for producing the trilogy was
66
$270 million. The three movies were a huge success, ranking as the
eleventh, fifth, and second most successful films of all time,
67
respectively. The movies made $2.92 billion at the worldwide box
68
office.
The soundtrack from the movie also met with particular success.
The film soundtrack by Canadian composer Howard Shore used a
69
technique called leitmotif, employing recurring musical themes to
bring out the characteristics of the people, places, and culture in the
70
movies. Radio listeners in the United Kingdom, captivated by the
music, voted the soundtrack as the greatest film soundtrack in a poll of
71
44,000 listeners in 2003. Finally, in addition to movies and music, a
72
massive multiplayer, online game was also developed from the novel.
In this case, the positive externalities spinning off from the novel are
considerable. Ideas that generate the production of derivative works
are externalities that are not captured in the price of the novel—
consumer surplus is created from the uncompensated positive

65. The Lord of the Rings Film Trilogy, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_
Lord_of_the_Rings_film_trilogy (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 665 (10th ed. 1998); see also
Leitmotif, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leitmotif (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
70. See Music of The Lord of the Rings Film Trilogy, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Music_of_The_Lord_of_the_Rings_film_trilogy (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
71. Ring Music Is “Best Ever,” BBC NEWS, Aug. 24, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/
entertainment/ 3177815.stm.
72. EA, Battle for Middle-Earth II, http://www.ea.com/official/lordoftherings/bfme2/
us/home.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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externalities that arise from the production of the novel. However, as
long as sufficient returns are made to cover the costs of producing the
novel together with reasonable profits accruing to the author, it does not
matter that society may place more value on the novel than the price
paid for it. The externalities—in other words, the additional costs that
society will pay in order to enjoy the novel—need not be accounted for
or internalized by the author in order for the author to recover the
74
investment made in the novel.
To allow internalization of all the
benefits to society from the production of the novel would allow the
author to claim a share in the successes of the subsequent movies, music,
and online games. In other words, for purposes of this example,
allowing full internalization of external benefits would enable Tolkien
to claim ownership over the entire spectrum of creative production.
It is correct that allowing the full internalization of externalities will
75
create monopolies, as Professor Lemley points out. However, allowing
the full internalization of externalities will also affect how copyrighted
works are created and produced. If the first producer of a creative work
is entitled to capture all consumer surpluses, authorship and the
generation of derivative works from the first producer will be stifled as
the first producer seeks to increase returns on investment in the first
work.
B. Information Goods: The Cause of Market Failures
Competitive markets fail for several reasons. In a circumstance in
which a producer or supplier of a good has market power, the producer

73. Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between
Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 439–40 (2005). Professor Sterk, in discussing
copyright externalities, speaks of the external benefits to consumers when copyrighted works
are widely disseminated. Id.
Intellectual works have the potential to generate network effects. The greater the
circulation of a work of art or literature, the more valuable the work becomes in
facilitating social and professional discourse. If I were the only person to read a
novel or see a movie, I would have no one with whom I could discuss the work.
Each additional consumer of the work creates value for me—value external to the
demand curve faced by the publisher. The network effect exists (in different
manifestations) for all intellectual works. If all students in a law school class are
familiar with the work of Locke or Coase, I would be able to explore some issues
more effectively than if only a fraction of the students are familiar with those works.
If students learn more as a result, the benefit will be felt by their clients—not by the
owner of the intellectual works of Locke or Coase.
Id.
74. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 592.
75. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1047.
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or supplier may choose to produce fewer goods at higher prices or
76
receive higher prices for less output. When this occurs, the market is
inefficient because an efficient market requires firms to make the same
pricing decisions in output production as consumers make in
77
consumption decisions. Markets may also fail when consumers do not
have accurate or adequate information about market prices or product
78
quality. Inaccurate or inadequate information may lead to producing
too much or too little of a product, leading consumers to make
uninformed decisions about the product and prevent some markets
79
from developing.
For the market for information goods, the market fails for two
reasons. First, markets may fail because of the presence of externalities
where market prices do not reflect the activities of producers and
consumers.
Second, failure may result because information is
essentially a public good, and once it is provided to consumers, it is
80
difficult to prevent others from thereafter consuming. Markets can,
81
therefore, sometimes undersupply public goods.
Externalities contribute toward market failures because benefits,
which accrue to other parties, are not captured within the market for the
82
good. The benefits from the derivative works of Tolkien’s novel are
not reflected in the market for the novel even though the production of
that work gave rise to the production of three films, a soundtrack, and
an online game. However, as discussed above, the extension of property

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gordon, supra note 9, at 1611.
Books . . . exhibit certain public goods characteristics. Once the literary
work . . . is made available to the public, the sequence of words or the discovery
might be used by countless consumers without exhausting the supply. Any number
of persons can simultaneously use the newly invented process or reprint the
literature without physically depriving others of use.
Id. Professor Gordon further discusses cases of market failure and states that
[w]hen . . . works yield such “external benefits,” the market cannot be relied upon as
a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable transactions.
In cases of externalities, then, the potential owner may wish to produce socially
meritorious new works by using some of the copyright owner’s material, yet be
unable to purchase permission because the market structure prevents him from
being able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized.
Id. at 1630–31.
81. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 593.
82. Id. at 592–93.
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rights to allow for the private internalization of these externalities is not
only unnecessary but also harmful to the creative process and
authorship of derivative works.
Introducing private property rights to encourage private bargaining
between the affected parties has been said to address these externalities
83
by protecting the goods from interference by others. To a large extent,
the law has addressed the failure of the market for information goods
84
and derivatives. The derivative right under copyright corrects market
85
failures by providing the right to make derivative works. The three
films, the soundtrack, and online games are derived from Tolkien’s
work, and the production of these new works would have to have been
the subject of private bargaining between Tolkien’s estate and the
producers of these new works. Private negotiations allow consumer
surplus to be captured and internalized to reflect the benefits accruing
86
to society.
Information goods are also public goods that are non-rivalrous and
87
nonexclusive.
As information goods are non-rivalrous and
nonexclusive, the marginal cost of providing the good to an additional
consumer is negligible and society’s consumption of the good cannot be
88
excluded. This allows externalities and free riding to occur and makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for the market to price and provide
89
information goods efficiently. When a large part of society benefits
from the good, private bargaining through rights provided under
copyright may not be an effective way to correct failures in the market.
In such cases, private ordering of rights may be necessary to ensure that

83. Id.
84. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1613.
85. Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 321 (2005).
[I]n a world without the derivative right, unauthorized derivative works will tend to
be close substitutes for the authorized derivative works. And they will tend to be
even closer substitutes for other unauthorized derivative works. Thus, sales of
unauthorized derivative works are more likely than sales of original works to come
at the expense of other works, and there will be an incentive that nudges authors
toward inefficiently high levels of imitation.
Id.
86. See Palmer, supra note 56, at 291–92 (discussing private contractual and other legal
remedies to internalize externalities, such as bailments to retain ownership of a work,
performance bonds, and trade association agreements).
87. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text.
88. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 644–45.
89. Id. at 644–47.
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those who value the goods most would be willing to pay for the good,
thereby ensuring that information goods are continuously produced.
In the context of online gaming as applied in The Lord of the Rings
example, the online community of gamers, which is built on the Internet
for massive multiplayer, role-playing games, would likely be willing to
pay the value of the game only when there are technologies that allow
90
exclusivity of the gaming community playing the game.
Through
technologies that prevent gamers from playing the game without paying
for the service through a subscription, game producers will be more
91
likely and willing to provide that service. In fact, Professor Lessig has
outlined this very point: the architecture of the Internet can be changed
and private ordering of rights through codes will change the interaction
92
among individuals over the Internet.
Markets for information goods fail because the nature of
information goods creates externalities that cannot be fully
93
internalized. Through law and private ordering of rights, some market
94
inefficiencies are corrected.
Through law, investments made in
producing creative works can be recovered and producers may recover
95
the average costs of production. Through private ordering of rights
facilitated by technologies, producers can ensure that they are able to
recover production costs for the good to the extent that the value in the
96
good is captured. However, the question of where the balance should
90. See Frischmann, supra note 62, at 943–44.
91. See Press Release, Mythic Entm’t, Mythic Entertainment Embraces Digital
Distribution for Dark Age of Camelot (Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.mythic
entertainment.com/press/dr_digital_dist_sep_30.html.
92. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 20–21. In virtual worlds—worlds that are connected
through networks like the Internet—communities form online, and each person controls a
character in real space and real time. The online world is built by the characters that live in it,
called “Avatars.” See id. Professor Lessig explains this as follows:
Avatar space is “regulated” though the regulation is special. In Avatar space,
regulation comes through code. The rules in Avatar space are imposed, not through
sanctions, and not by the state, but by the very architecture of the particular space.
A law is defined, not through a statute, but through a code that governs the space.
Id. at 20.
93. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1631–32.
94. See id. The fair use doctrine is an example of the intervention of law when markets
fail to provide for consensual transfers.
95. John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost
Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1077–78 (2005). Professor Duffy explains that “[i]n a market
economy with free flow of capital, those who invest resources in intellectual property creation
will, on average, always expect to recover their fixed costs of producing their intellectual
property—no less and no more.” Id.
96. Depoorter, supra note 13, at 25. Professor Depoorter, speaking in the context of
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be set to ensure that the private right captures the value of the good and
does not go beyond capture of product value to wealth transfer from the
user to the producer remains unanswered.
C. Correction of Market Failures Through Institutional Intervention
The correction of market failures in the markets for information
goods must be made through intellectual property law. For the
purposes of literary and artistic works, copyright law provides the
institutional intervention to correct the inefficiencies created from
97
consumer surplus that are not internalized by the producer.
The
reproduction right—preventing the reproduction of the work—captures
98
the value of a work by limiting uses of the work. A user who pays a
price for the purchase of a novel is not entitled to make copies of the
book without the author’s permission because the novel price does not
99
include a right to make copies of the work. A purchaser of a book has
the ability to make copies of the book and sell the copies, creating a
benefit that is not within the market for the book, itself. Similarly,
distributing a novel without the author’s permission constitutes an
action that is not accounted for in the market price for the novel.
Without the recognition of the distribution right of copyright, producers
of literary and artistic works will not be able to efficiently price their
works while users freely make copies of the works and distribute them.
The derivative right, to a large extent, protects the producer of works
against chains of markets that develop from the producer’s initial
cyberspace, states that “intellectual property law allows content providers to internalize the
commercial strategy between authored works and new technological means of distribution
and presentation of information.” Id.
97. See id. at 53–56 (discussing collective rights organizations as institutions to
coordinate pricing of copyright licenses); Gordon, supra note 9, at 1600 (discussing fair use as
an institutional correction for market failures in the market for copyrighted works); Sterk,
supra note 73, at 426 (discussing the need for property rights to play an important role in
neoclassical economic theory to correct inefficient markets); see also Shubha Ghosh,
Copyright as Privatization: The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653 (2004) (discussing
the function of copyright as a theory of democratic governance to encourage cultural
production).
98. Durham, supra note 59, at 877 (“The purchaser of a painting, book, compact disc, or
DVD does not acquire, automatically, the exclusive right of reproduction, performance,
display, or adaptation.”).
99. See Abramowicz, supra note 85, at 326–27. “Copyright’s reproduction right
provided Margaret Mitchell and her publisher an incentive to ‘invest time and money in
writing, editing, producing and promoting the popular novel, . . . knowing that no one may
copy the work’s expressive content without their consent.’” Id. (quoting Paul Goldstein,
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209,
216 (1983)).

NG ARTICLE

2007]

COPYRIGHT’S EMPIRE

357

market and that create their own positive externalities. When this
occurs, the market for information goods cannot efficiently dictate a fair
market value for the good because producers are under compensated
for the value of the good, thereby causing too little production of the
100
work.
Copyright law provides a market solution by affording to producers
of literary and artistic works the ability to capture positive externalities
101
to more accurately reflect the value of their works.
It is impossible,
for example, for Tolkien to capture all external benefits from the
publication of his work. Tolkien has externalized the benefits from his
authorship and is not able to internalize the benefits to reflect the true
value of his work. Other producers would be able to create derivative
works out of the novel and create new markets with new positive
externalities that would undermine the investment in and value of the
original work. Where producers of literary and artistic works have
property rights over the work, they are able to appropriate some of the
profits that others make from using their works. Through the property
right, which provides producers of literary and artistic works the ability
to recover a profit that reflects the value of their works, competitive
markets are better able to adequately support authorship and provide
encouragement to producers of literary and artistic works to produce
works that the market will sustain.
The grant of a property right to producers of literary and artistic
works in the absolute sense, however, will have an adverse effect if
producers have the right to determine the value and prices for their
102
works. The distortion of markets can also occur when producers price
their products above fair market value; in circumstances where it is
difficult to place a value on an intangible product—such as literary and
artistic works—there is a risk that producers will overprice their
products and seek a return in excess of the marginal cost of
100. Palmer, supra note 56, at 275 (stating that goods of a public nature that allow for
non-rivalrous consumption and nonexclusivity provide consumers with an incentive to free
ride).
101. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 55, 61–62 (2001). This may be done through price discrimination in the markets for
copyrighted works. The law regulates the relationship between a producer of copyrighted
works and competing producers, distributors, and users.
102. See Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 675, 687 (1993). Professor Brennan explains that “[c]opyright, by allowing a
copyright holder to exclude those unwilling to pay the chosen price, will exclude those who
are willing to pay a positive price . . . but are not willing to pay the copyright holder’s price.”
Id.
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104

production. When this occurs, deadweight losses are created. The
result of such deadweight loss is that some consumers will not be willing
105
to pay more than it costs to produce the work. These consumers will
either be denied access to the work or may resort to piracy to obtain the
106
work at a price below the market.
In a market for derivatives, absolute copyright protection will also
affect the derivative markets of the initial work. If a producer of a work
is given the right to control uses of ideas and imposes high licensing fees,
107
the ability of new producers to produce new works will be affected. If
Tolkien, for example, had the absolute right over The Lord of the Rings,
no one else would be able to capture any benefit from making
derivatives. The producer of the films, Peter Jackson, would not be able
to profit from the sale of the films and would not be able to capture any
benefit from the movie audiences.
Rent-seeking behavior by producers of works is also an undesired
outcome of absolute property rights. Producers of literary and artistic
works may spend large amounts of money to acquire or maintain a
108
monopoly position.
An example would be to expand the term of
103. See Sterk, supra note 73, at 467.
Ordinarily, propertization of resources is extolled for its ability to internalize
externalities; if a property owner can capture all external benefits created by the
resource, the owner is more likely to use the resource efficiently. When the
resource is non-rival, however, complete propertization may result not in the
capture of external benefits, but in their dissipation. The owner will typically charge
a positive price for the resource even though the marginal cost of distributing
another unit is zero, resulting in a deadweight loss. Avoiding this loss serves as a
foundation for the doctrinal limitations on copyright protection—durational limits,
fair use and first sale among them.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1059.
106. Id. This would result in “static economic inefficiency that may be great or trivial,
depending on the intellectual property right in question.” Id.
107. Abramowicz, supra note 85, at 361 (stating that derivative rights come with social
costs); Durham, supra note 59, at 896–900 (discussing consumer modifications of copyrighted
works and whether a copyright owner should be legally entitled to prohibit the modification
when the purpose of the modification is to make the work more meaningful or appealing to
the consumer).
108. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1063.
The very process of government granting rights over creations encourages creators
to petition Congress to give them still more rights. . . . This rent seeking is a cost of
government-granted intellectual property rights. Indeed, economic theory suggests
that private parties will spend up to the total value of the benefit seeking to capture
it.
Id. at 1063–64.
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109

copyright protection or increase the laws protecting copyrighted
110
works. To Professor Lemley, legislative rent-seeking behaviors of this
111
form are a cost of the rights provided by the government.
Enforcement of copyright is also expensive in terms of legal fees as well
as time spent by courts, legislators, law enforcement officers and
112
administrative agencies.
Finally, it is harmful to extend protection
beyond the point that is necessary to enable producers of works to
recover their investments.
The creation of absolute rights to allow for full control over external
benefits from the production of works does not exist with any other
113
form of property. If it were to be allowed in intellectual property, the
result might end up being to encourage too much investment in
114
creativity that does not resonate with other forms of production.
There is a balance that must be struck in order to achieve
equilibrium in the market for information goods. Rights must be
sufficient in order that producers of literary and artistic works may
recover investments made to produce the works and make sufficient
profits to have incentives to continue to produce new works. At the
same time, it is important to ensure that the public is able to enjoy the
benefits of literary and artistic authorship.
115
Economic theories do not provide an adequate solution. The line
between the private right to control and the public interest in accessing
116
information goods remains an elusive one.
Arriving at a single
solution that states where the balance should be is an elusive goal given
that there are so many variables within economic theories that would
affect where the ideal balance should be—such variables include, among
109. In 1998, Congress extended the copyright term by twenty years by passing the
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
110. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) makes it a criminal offence to
produce and disseminate technology that would circumvent measures taken to protect
copyrighted works. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C). It also increases the penalties for
infringing copyrighted works on the Internet. Id.
111. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1063–64.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1069. Professor Lemley suggests that “the economic arguments for property
don’t justify the full internalization of social surplus as a general matter, but only in the
limited circumstances of the tragedy of the commons. The leap from property right to
‘despotic dominion’ is not a universal one.” Id.
114. Professor Lemley takes up a more thorough discussion of the costs of absolute
intellectual property. See id. at 1058–65.
115. Id. at 1065.
116. Id.
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others, the type of creation, the nature of work, the market structure,
the supply and demand of goods, the investment made in production,
117
and the distribution channels.
Although the proper economic balance cannot be found in economic
118
theories, law and technology scholarship has, nevertheless, shown that
technology may provide a private solution to drawing the boundaries of
119
private ownership.
The onus on achieving a fair balance between
120
private rights and public interests resides with the producers of works.
Therefore, the discussion must now turn to identifying how technologies
may play a role in providing a balance for determining where copyright
should begin and where it should end.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT
The development of new technologies has always affected markets
121
for literary and artistic works.
Scholars often refer to the printing
press as the technology that gave rise to copyright as a system of rules to
122
regulate printing.
Authors began to realize the economic value of
their works as printing presses emerged and this new technology
123
allowed for works to be quickly and cheaply reproduced. In delivering

117. Scholarship on intellectual property has used many different points of economic
analysis for justification. See id. at 1075.
118. Id. at 1065–69.
119. See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 943, 993 (1998).
120. There is an onus on the producers of creative works to recognize the changing
landscape of consumption of literary and artistic works as consumers begin to exert
personalized choices about what content to use and how they use content. The architecture
of the Internet provides this ability and content producers may be in the best position to
ensure that private choices and social values are embodied in the manner they produce and
distribute content. Professor Lessig points out that “[w]hat people listen to and what they
find compelling are matters of private not public choice.” LESSIG, supra note 17, at 263.
121. See Brian A. Carlson, Comment, Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50
SMU L. REV. 825, 827 (1997) (stating that “[t]he history of copyright law is replete with
examples of new technology pushing the outer limits of copyright law, often to the point of
forcing copyright law to evolve or risk becoming ineffective at promoting its underlying
goal”).
122. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1994). According to
Patry, “[t]he printing press, with its ability to make multiple copies of a work easily, is
frequently cited as the impetus for efforts to secure a more formal type of protection for
books.” Id.
123. For further information about the effect of the printing press on the early book
reproduction trade of the fifteenth century, see Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and
Middlemen, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
124
City Studios, Inc., Justice Stevens outlined the following:
From its beginning the law of copyright has developed as a
response to significant changes in technology. Indeed, it was the
invention of a new form of copying equipment—the printing
press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright
protection. Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in
this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new
125
rules that new technology made necessary.
The role of technology is central to the development of copyright law.
Technology provides producers of information goods with the ability
126
to define their property rights over their works.
Technology can
either provide or restrict access to works, and it can either strengthen
the position of the producer or provide greater freedom to consumers to
127
use the work. Professor Lessig’s work illustrates how technology may
be used to define the balance between private control and public access
to works; he suggests that responsible use of technologies will lead
toward greater freedom of creative expression within a reasonable
128
system of property that continues to encourage authorship.
The
information commons—the area that comprises creative ideas and
works that are free to the public to use and are crucially important to
129
the development of new works and innovation —must be protected
against technological controls that erect private barriers and restrict
public access to these building blocks of creativity and innovation.
Technology has also provided greater freedom to society to
participate in the creative process. More consumers are able to capture
the benefits from the production of creative works into their own works
and activities, creating derivatives and market externalities of their

124. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
125. Id. at 430–31.
126. The networked economy presents radically different and decentralized production
and distribution functions for the market. Professor Benkler explains that “the networked
information economy can be more open and admit of many more diverse possibilities for
organizing production and consumption than could the physical economy.” Yochai Benkler,
Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245,
1247 (2003).
127. There are increased possibilities for peer production and joint creation of works.
See id. at 1256.
128. See LESSIG, supra note 14.
129. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 49. Professor Lessig defines three aspects of the
commons, and defines the third aspect as “the commons of innovation . . . the opportunity,
kept open to anyone, to innovate and build upon the platform of the network.” Id.
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own.
The reproduction, distribution, and derivative rights under
copyright become more important to provide a fair market exchange so
that producers may capture the fair market value of works and
131
consumers are able to create wealth from the original productions.
Several things are clear from the exercise of these rights by the
producers of creative works: first, the balance of power between the
producer and users will change depending on the technology that is
available to either provide control or increase access to works; second,
technologies are tools that will assist producers of creative works to
grow as markets for information goods change; and third, technology
cannot provide the balance between private control and public access to
works. Only copyright—as an institution of law—can fill that need.
A. Capturing Social Surplus in Markets for Information Goods
We have moved past the questions of whether rights in literary and
artistic works should be protected. The answer to that question is a
resounding “yes.” This leads, though, to the question of how these
works should be protected.
These works should be protected to the extent that the producer of
the work is able to recover the marginal cost of production and also
make reasonable profits from the production as an incentive to produce.
It is difficult and harmful to attempt to capture and internalize all
positive externalities. Some of these externalities will not be accounted
for in prices for the goods. However, where copyright law clearly
defines property rights over the work, the producer of creative works
may internalize some positive externalities from the production of the
132
work.
In competitive markets, this takes place through private
133
The
bargaining between the producer and consumer of the work.
value of the work is reflected in prices set through negotiations.
Transaction costs are incurred through the negotiations for permission
to use the work at a fair price.
On the Internet, technologies provide control over works that are
not possible in real space. An example of a control that would be
impossible to enforce in real space is the purchase of a novel. Professor

130. See Depoorter, supra note 13, at 27; Frischmann, supra note 62, at 1019.
131. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440–41 (1984).
132. Gordon, supra note 44, at 1048–49; Hardy, supra note 44, at 234.
133. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1612–13 (discussing copyright’s role in facilitating the
“consensual market in four ways: it creates property rights, lowers transactions costs,
provides valuable information, and contains mechanisms for enforcement”).
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Lessig sets forth an example of a police officer being “sold” with each
book to ensure that the buyer uses the book in a way consistent with
134
However, the
what was agreed upon when the book was sold.
prohibitive costs of attaching a police officer with the sale of a book to
monitor uses of the book will not permit differential pricing for different
social benefits that arise from the use of the book. For example, a
producer may try to price a book at one dollar if the buyer agrees to
read the book only once, and he or she will price the book at one
hundred dollars if the buyer plans to read the book more than one
135
hundred times. Technologies, however, permit this form of bundling
and differential pricing to capture social surpluses in accordance with
136
the value each user places on the goods. Media subscription services
for information provided over the Internet are a good example of
bundling and differential pricing to reflect the user’s value for the
137
good. As a result of these new technologies that allow producers to
define the boundaries of their property rights, prices of information
goods may be set according to the value users ascribe to them—users
who value the good more will be willing to pay more, thereby reducing
deadweight losses in the market place.
The benefit of technologies in the market may be secondary to the
harm that will arise when these technologies are used by producers of
information in two ways: (1) to draw boundaries around information
that rightfully should belong to the commons, and (2) to prevent the
development of technology that allows consumers to capture positive
138
externalities and benefits from the market.
In many cases, external
benefits are never captured and it would be harmful to society if all
producers of information goods were to try to capture and internalize all
positive externalities. Professor Lessig provides the example of
“copyright bots,” which are computer programs that scan Web pages on
the Internet and allow content owners to identify and request sites that

134. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 127–30.
135. See id. at 128.
136. See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?
Economic Analysis, Price
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2024–25 (2000)
(discussing the technologies that may be used to bundle and price discriminate based on a
consumer’s ability and willingness to pay).
137. See Meurer, supra note 101, at 72. Professor Meurer explains how “[s]ellers
measure preferences by observing buyers’ choices.” Id.
138. Reverse engineering, for example, is a positive externality in the form of
competition by a potential inventor and market entrant. See Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1057 (1997).
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contain potentially infringing materials to be shut down. For example,
EMI requested that an online guitar archive, which hosted a site to
allow guitar hobbyists to exchange chord sequences, be shut down
140
because of potential copyright infringement.
The difficulties of
tracking and internalizing externalities in real space do not apply to the
Internet, and the potential for drawing boundaries around market
activities that are rightfully public and external to the market for the
information goods is substantially increased, thereby extending rights
beyond the necessary limits, and the producers of information goods are
able to transfer wealth from the public to themselves.
Attempts to capture consumer surplus in the market for information
goods also have the potential effect of displacing intermediaries or
information carriers, which provide content to users on the Internet.
141
The decision in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. did precisely that.
In Napster, an Internet start-up company, which allowed its users to
142
exchange music files, was shut down.
The software that Napster
developed provided an online community with a service that enabled
users to share and exchange files, including MP3s and music files in an
143
audio format, through a central server.
The software created an
extensive network that allowed people to enjoy and share their favorite
144
music, not unlike two friends exchanging music that they enjoy. On
the Internet, however, this form of market activity was regarded as an
145
activity that the law did not permit. Record companies were allowed
to internalize positive externalities from potential markets—markets
that the recording companies had not yet captured. Evidence that there
was a substantial likelihood that Napster would adversely affect the
potential market for copyrighted works was accepted by Judge Patel
based on a claim that three general types of harm would occur if the
Napster software were to be allowed: “a decrease in retail sales,
especially among college students; an obstacle to the . . . plaintiff’s
future entry into the digital downloading market; and a social devaluing
146
of music stemming from its free distribution.” Recording companies
139. LESSIG, supra note 17, at 180–83.
140. Id. at 182–83.
141. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
aff’d, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
142. See id.
143. Id. at 906.
144. Id. at 905–08.
145. Id. at 927.
146. Id. at 914.
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may suffer these effects, but this does not justify the expansion of
property rights.
Consumer surplus should only be captured within existing markets,
and rights should not be expanded to markets that do not yet exist or
which the information good producer has not yet entered. Rights must
be exercised within existing markets and within existing boundaries that
147
clearly define property rights. In Sony, the Supreme Court dealt with
a novel and new technology—the videocassette recorder (VCR)—by
considering largely the general societal benefits, which the new
148
technology brought.
The Court regarded these benefits as far
outweighing the more nebulous claim by the copyright owner that the
use of the VCR crossed “invisible boundaries” of control that copyright
149
owners have over their programs. Regarding the use of the VCR for
home time-shifting purposes to be a fair use of a copyright owner’s
content, the Supreme Court emphasized the requirement that the
copyright owner demonstrate some likelihood of harm before a private
150
act of time-shifting is to be condemned as a violation of federal law.
Justice Stevens, however, in delivering the majority opinion of the
Court, recognized that this may be a right that Congress did not intend
151
for the copyright owners.
It was not the job of the courts, Justice
152
Stevens reasoned, to apply laws that had not been written. In other
words, providers of information goods must only capture consumer
surplus within existing markets.

147. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
148. Id. at 454.
149. See id. at 456. While nuances in perceptions and points of philosophy are
understandable, the district court did not think there was justification for an injunction
against the use of the VCR. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp.
429, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464
U.S. 417 (1984). The district court determined that harm from time-shifting was speculative
and minimal. Id.
150. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
151. Id. at 456.
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have made
it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.
Id.
152. See id.
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B. Correction of Market Failures Through Technologies
Markets for information goods will always fail precisely because of
externalities that prevent adequate expression of benefits to society in
price and economic decision making by producers of information goods.
Recognizing private property rights in information goods is one way to
encourage private producers to fund the production of these goods—
153
goods that are essentially nonexclusive and non-rivalrous.
Technologies have a significant role in correcting these failures and
improving efficiencies in the market. One of the most significant
technological developments is the Internet, where the potential to
connect authors to their audience is unlimited. The inefficiency of
markets for information goods can be corrected when technologies are
used to ensure that producers of information goods work under proper
conditions to encourage authorship and society has access to works that
are essential toward social development and growth. Through the
proper balance between private property and the public interest,
information goods may be efficiently produced and allocated in the
market.
The economics of creative production has always been dependent on
the technologies that allowed cheaper copies of a literary and artistic
work to be made and distributed to a far wider audience. The more
copies made and the more people to whom the work is distributed, the
154
greater the revenue for the producer. Just as the printing press long
ago altered the economics of information goods production, the Internet
has altered the economics for information goods production of this age.
Unlike prior technologies, the Internet now provides the ability for
producers of information goods to privately order their rights to
maximize revenue from the public. Media subscription services allow
information to be bundled, packaged, and suited to the consumer’s
preferences. As many as one million consumers subscribe to online
155
gaming services to be part of a virtual community. Individual tracks of
music may be downloaded or streamed from an online music provider,
and the purchase of films has also become possible through the Internet.
The media information distributor, motion picture companies, and

153. Gordon, supra note 44, at 1048–49; Hardy, supra note 44, at 234; Palmer, supra
note 56, at 275–76.
154. See Depoorter, supra note 13, at 35–36.
155. The combined global membership of subscription and non-subscription games
exceeds fifteen million. See Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG),
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MMORPG (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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sound recording companies have been displaced, and authors,
themselves, are now directly connected to the consumers of their
literary and artistic works.
Professor Paul Goldstein portended the changes that copyright
156
markets would face with the Internet twelve years ago.
He wrote
about a “celestial jukebox,” a metaphor for the technological
157
possibilities for copyright markets in the future. The celestial jukebox
is a “technology-packed satellite orbiting thousands of miles above
158
Earth, awaiting a subscriber’s order” to connect the subscriber to a
storehouse of information and content that the subscriber will pay for
159
When this metaphor was first conceived, its
and receive.
infrastructure was a figment of imagination, but today, the Internet has
brought the celestial jukebox metaphor to life.
Professor Goldstein’s foresight of the changes technology would
bring to the market for information goods has proved quite accurate.
First, Professor Goldstein suggested that “the celestial jukebox may
reduce transaction costs of negotiating licenses . . . for complete
160
works . . . [and] for small fragments as well.”
He foresaw the
emergence of technologies to enable copyright owners to charge users
differently in accordance to the value of each element of a work that is
161
used. The capacity of the celestial jukebox to charge subscribers for
162
access and to shut a service off if the subscriber fails to pay the bills is
evident in the current practices of music streaming subscription services
163
and online music catalogues like Rhapsody, among others.
Second,
Professor Goldstein foresaw the greater role authors would play in the
market for literary and artistic works and the lessening role that book
publishers and motion picture and record producers would have in the
164
market. Today, this may be seen in the rise of the many independent
musicians and composers who have made their music available to the

156. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 199 (1994).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 223–24.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 224.
163. See, e.g., Welcome on Rhapsody, http://www.rhapsody.com/welcome (last visited
Apr. 20, 2007).
164. GOLDSTEIN, supra note156, at 234–35.
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public through online independent music communities with free hosting
165
of independent music, such as GarageBand.com.
The reduction of transaction costs as license negotiations become
more efficient between producers of information goods and users, as
well as the displacement of the distributor of content by Internet
technologies and networks, contribute toward correcting market
inefficiencies for literary and artistic works.
New technologies,
especially the connectivity facilitated by networks on the Internet, have
166
contributed to a more efficient market for literary and artistic works.
However, it is also important to note that the celestial jukebox will not
entirely replace traditional copyright markets. In traditional copyright
markets, the law is the primary institution to provide an efficient
outcome between private rights and the public interest.
C. Copyright as an Institution for Balancing Private Control and Public
Access
The balance between private control and public access is important
in copyright law because the underlying purpose for the grant of
property rights in literary and artistic works is to promote education and
learning within society from the availability of literary and artistic
167
works. Harkening back to the origins of copyright law, the Statute of
Anne was intended to impose the burden of literary and artistic
production upon booksellers in order to meet the public interest for
168
learning.
Within today’s copyright framework, the property rights
granted by the law cannot be absolute in the sense that producers may
impose prices that go beyond the fair value that consumers would be
willing to pay. Some externalities in the market will have to remain
169
external to the market and cannot be internalized.
In Donaldson v.

165. GarageBand.com, http://www.garageband.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
166. See Burk, supra note 119, at 948.
167. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
168. See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting
the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 409 (2004).
[T]he Statute of Anne . . . had as its foremost objective, the encouragement of
learning—a general public interest—not the private economic interests of authors,
printers or publishers. It did have a secondary interest for the economic security of
authors and other proprietors of books and writings, but this secondary concern was
driven by the impact that the void of regulation had upon the creation of “useful
books.”
Id.
169. See Frischmann, supra note 62, at 988–89.
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170

Beckett, decided by the House of Lords, Lord Camden made a similar
observation, mentioning that producers cannot maintain monopolistic
prices over literary and artistic works; if that were to occur, then “[a]ll
our learning will be locked upon in the hands of the Tonsons and the
Lintons of the age, who will set what price upon it their avarice chuses
to demand, till the public become as much their slaves, as their own
171
hackney compilers are.”
Two aspects of copyright law are particularly important in balancing
private rights and the public interest. The first—the fair use doctrine—
172
is codified in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. The doctrine outlined
173
in § 107 provides guidelines to assist courts in determining fair use,
and courts have regarded the four factors outlined therein as being
174
equally important in undertaking an analysis of fair use. According to
Professor Wendy Gordon, fair use is employed to “permit
uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of
175
effectuation through the market.”
When markets do not function
effectively to allocate resources among individuals—as is the case, for
example, when “the markets fail to generate economically desirable
outcomes when using the market process would threaten other social
goals”—other modes of resource control will be employed by the legal,
176
economic, or social system to reallocate resources.
The fair use
doctrine, which is the “judicial response to market failure in the
177
copyright context,” serves to allocate resources between the copyright
owner and users when it is otherwise impossible for users to obtain
authorization from copyright owners for the use of the work.

170. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.). Donaldson v. Beckett
established the precedent that the Statute of Anne prevailed over common law property
rights. Id. Rights and remedies attached to a work were to be determined under statutory
provisions. See PATRY, supra note 122, at 13–14; see also LYMAN RAY PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 175 (1968).
171. Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. 837; L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 42 (1991).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
173. Id. Factors to be considered in determining fair use are the purpose and character
of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
174. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 21 (1992).
175. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1601.
176. See id. at 1605.
177. See id.
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Fair use, however, may have very little application for activities
178
taking place on the online market for information goods.
Precisely
because direct contact is possible between users and producers of
information goods, transaction costs to obtain permission for use is
substantially reduced and, hence, there is very little place for
exemptions in the law, including the application of the fair use
179
doctrine.
However, the application of the doctrine in real space has
important effects—resources may be efficiently allocated and wealth
distributed between private and public interests. The implication of
applying fair use in real space is pivotal to the public’s use of
information goods for purposes such as research, education, and
building new works from existing ones.
The fair use doctrine will better serve to balance private rights and
public interests if the doctrine is construed with the public interest aim
in mind. The four factors to be considered under § 107 do not take into
account the interests of society in producing new works from old ones
and in using literary and artistic works for the purposes of education and
180
growth. The public interest in having access to works is not read into
181
Indeed, this point was made by Professor
the framework of § 107.
Shubha Ghosh when he noted that fair use analysis has always been
182
framed to resolve conflicts between two private rights holders.
In
Sony, the doctrine was applied between the motion picture producers
183
and the VCR producer. In Napster, fair use was applied between the
184
recording companies and the software producer. In neither case was
the right of the public a consideration in determining whether the use of
185
In both cases, the analysis focused on the
the work was fair or not.
effect of the new technology on the market and economics of the
186
creative content business.
Professor Ghosh argues for a fair use
construction that does not place the market as the central point of
187
analysis. He argues that markets are just one part of the equation that

178. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 224.
179. Id.
180. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
181. Id.
182. Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 484 (2003).
183. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
184. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
185. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896.
186. See sources cited supra note 185.
187. See Ghosh, supra note 182, at 484–91.
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strikes the balance in copyright.
Other institutions that disseminate
information goods to the public, such as libraries and universities, must
play a role along with markets to determine the effect of an act upon the
189
public.
Professor Ghosh’s argument is a compelling one. In the search for a
balance between private rights and public interests, Professor Ghosh
190
argues that copyright law is a form of privatization —the government’s
way of getting authors to produce literary and artistic works for the
public. If that is the case, then there is a need to understand that public
good underlies the law and that there may be a need to de-privatize
191
copyright law in order to achieve the public good. Literary and artistic
works are not purely private artifacts to be protected by property rights
192
as an entitlement. Rather, the grant of a right serves a larger purpose:
literary and artistic production for society’s ultimate benefit.
Construing copyright as a form of privatization shifts our focus from
economics or technology as the primary tools for achieving a balance
between private rights and public interests.
As has been argued in this Article, economic theories and
technological developments show that there must be a balance between
private and public interests, but neither offers answers to where the
balance should be set. Conceiving of copyright as a system of
privatization permits the insertion of public values in copyright analysis,
including fair use. This is particularly important when technologies
have made consumers of literary and artistic works into producers of
new or derivative works. If technologies have made markets perfect
and transaction costs zero, the conception of fair use with the public
interest will allow the public to use literary and artistic works for
purposes of education, growth, and research.

188. Id.
189. See id. at 489–91.
190. See id. at 484.
191. See id. at 390.
192. See id. at 413.
Copyright debates in the nineteenth century were infused with questions of
democratic values and representation, particularly as the freedoms of press and
speech were implicated. Copyright’s development in the twentieth century and
current debates over copyright and developing countries are intimately connected to
the establishment of accountable government institutions and reliable, independent
media. Copyright theory has intimate links with broader theories of democratic
governance.
Id.
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The second aspect of copyright that ensures public access to literary
and artistic works is the idea of originality and the idea-expression
dichotomy. The U.S. Copyright Act expressly provides that ideas are
193
ineligible for copyright protection and the courts have consistently
affirmed the freedom of the public to use ideas underlying works to
194
195
In Baker v. Selden, a system of
produce new and creative works.
ruled lines and headings was used to illustrate a method of bookkeeping
and the Supreme Court had to answer the question of whether
copyright existed in the system of bookkeeping if there was copyright in
196
the book, itself.
While it was clear that the book conveyed
information on the subject of bookkeeping and contained detailed
explanations of the art of bookkeeping, it was more evident to the Court
that there was a clear distinction between the book and the art that it
197
was intended to illustrate.
Novelty in the art expressed in the book
198
should be protected through the patent system. “To give to the author
of the book an exclusive property in the art [through copyright],” when
no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be to
199
fraud the public. Unless a patent was obtained for the art contained
within the book, the public should be able to have access to the ideas
200
contained in the book. Copyright in the book was separate from the
201
ideas in it. While the public cannot print and publish the book or any
material in it, the bookkeeping system therein was an art that the public
202
could use and practice.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
203
Rural Telephone Service Co. reflected a more definitive approach to
the question of originality. The Court denied copyright protection to
compilations of facts unless the compiled facts, by their selection and
arrangement, displayed the requisite originality necessary to protect the
193. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Again, the Copyright Act states that “[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Id.
194. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
195. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
196. Id.
197. See id. at 102.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 103.
201. Id. at 99.
202. See id.
203. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1990).
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204

compilation under copyright laws. In Feist, the Court had to decide if
copyright protection could exist for the publication of a typical
205
telephone directory that consisted of white pages and yellow pages.
The Court held that there is a copyright in the directory as a whole
because it contains some forward text and some original material in the
206
yellow pages. However, the white pages were not protected because
that material did not meet the prerequisite of originality required for
207
protection. “Sweat of the brow” was not a sufficient justification for
the grant of a copyright in the work—a copyright may not be earned
merely as a reward for the hard work accompanying the compilation of
208
facts. The Court held, however, that the grant of a copyright in factual
compilations is possible in situations where the facts are selected,
coordinated, and arranged in such a manner that they satisfy the
209
originality requirement. To the Court, “[o]riginality requires only that
the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e.,
without copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and
210
that it display some minimal level of creativity.”
In this case, the
selection of names, towns, and telephone numbers to fill up the white
pages was “devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity” and was,
211
therefore, unable to qualify for copyright protection. Although there
was sufficient effort exerted to make the white pages directory useful,
there was insufficient creativity to make the directory an original
212
work.
The Court went on to make it clear that “copyright rewards
213
originality, not effort.”
The idea-expression dichotomy, however, may not provide a
complete solution to balancing the private and public interests in
copyright. Professor Amy Cohen argues that the idea-expression
dichotomy does not sit comfortably in copyright law because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to separate ideas from the expression of a
214
work. To provide protection for expressions of creativity in works and

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 359–61.
Id. at 348, 358.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 362–63.
Id. at 364.
Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression

NG ARTICLE

374 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2

to make the underlying ideas available to the public as building blocks
of creativity may not be possible because new artists may find it difficult
215
to extract the “idea” without the “expression” of an existing work. On
this argument, it is said that the idea-expression dichotomy cannot
provide an objective framework for the courts to separate parts of a
work that ought to be protected in favor of the author and parts of the
216
work that ought to fall within the public domain. Without an objective
or philosophical basis to distinguish ideas from expressions in works of
art, an assessment of ideas from expressions will be a subjective
217
determination based on a judge’s artistic value of the work. However,
we may refer back to copyright law as an institution to further the public
good in addressing what should constitute free ideas and what should be
protected as expressions. Parts of works that society can use as building
blocks to further education, learning, and growth should be made
available as ideas. The test of what constitutes free ideas is whether the
idea can be used in another work without seeming like the original
expression. Putting ruled lines in a book for accounting purposes, for
example, is an idea that will prevent society from benefiting if it is
exclusively protected. Plots of plays, story lines, and research findings
218
are ideas that society should be able to use. The way these ideas are
communicated to the public and the manner in which plots, story lines,
and music are expressed to capture society’s attention and imagination
are justifiably expressions to be protected to encourage creative
authorship.
Fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy allow institutional
intervention into markets for information goods to ensure that rights
holders do not extend rights into realms of the public where literary and

Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990).
215. Id. at 231.
216. Id. at 219.
217. Id. at 231–32.
218. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990). Professor
Litman addresses the fundamental building blocks of ideas, which inspire the production of
literary and artistic works. She describes the process of creation as follows:
[c]omposers recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base their
characters on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other playwrights’
characters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots within their
experience; software writers use the logic they find in other software; lawyers
transform old arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers, actors, choreographers,
architects, and sculptors all engage in the process of adapting, transforming, and
recombining what is already “out there” in some other form.
Id. at 966–67.
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artistic works are needed. Technologies, particularly the Internet, have
redefined copyright markets and made bundling, differential pricing,
and media subscription services tools to correct market failings where
prices of goods have not been accurately reflective of the values
consumers place on literary and artistic works. Transaction costs are
almost zero, and fair use, which has been the judiciary’s response to
failing content markets, may no longer serve a purpose in correcting
219
market inefficiencies.
The only way to ensure that private rights do
not overwhelm public interests is through copyright as an institution to
encourage authorship for public benefits. In the concluding paragraph
of Copyright’s Highway, Professor Goldstein expresses that “[t]he main
challenge will be to keep . . . [copyright’s] trajectory clear of the buffets
of protectionism and true to copyright’s historic logic that the best
prescription for connecting authors to their audiences is to extend rights
into every corner where consumers derive value from literary and
220
artistic works.”
Rights are important to encourage authorship and
221
These rights must encourage
respect for copyright as an institution.
authors to produce literary and artistic works first before the public
interest can be met. Nonetheless, it is equally important to recognize
the rights as serving an end—that of providing literary and artistic works
for the public’s benefit. Internalizing every benefit in society from the
production of literary and artistic works is not the intent of copyright
law.
CONCLUSION
Consumers and the public in general derive value from the creation
of literary and artistic works—we must recognize that authorship is the
primary activity that contributes to this benefit. Private rights may be
the most feasible manner to encourage authorship. Through the
guarantee that investments in producing works will be recovered,
authors are more inclined to engage in creative production, even though
there may be ancillary reasons to engage in these forms of activities,
such as deriving satisfaction from producing art and being able to
contribute to the greater societal good. Realistically, however, authors
must be remunerated for their work. The patronage system of

219. See Boyle, supra note 136, at 2014.
220. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 236.
221. See Alina Ng, Taking Copyright Seriously: Abridging Rights Is More Serious than
Inflating Rights (Berkeley Elec. Press, Paper No. 1479, 2006), available at http://law.bepress.
com/expresso/eps/1479/.
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remunerating authors for their works is arguably still intact; the
production of creative works, however, has just been delegated to
222
private firms. In any event, the intent remains the same: literary and
artistic works are to be produced for the public interest.
The grant of property rights with the underlying purpose of
furthering general social goals of learning and education comes with its
challenges. The nature of information, being public and essentially nonrivalrous and non-exclusive (particularly in real space), creates market
externalities that cannot and should not be fully internalized by the
223
producer. Some consumer surplus will not be captured and free riding
will occur. However, these should be acceptable market conditions for
information goods. Copyright addresses these inefficiencies and, to a
large extent, corrects them. Technologies have also contributed
significantly to correcting market failures in markets for information
goods. Exemptions in law, such as fair use, may have very little effect in
addressing market failures because the networks of the Internet build
connections between producers and users for consensual bargaining to
take place.
The law matters, however, because in real space, a large segment of
society does not have access to creative works and information for
224
development and growth. There is an increasing global awareness that
information and knowledge are necessary for development and
progress. An example is the Access to Knowledge (A2K) movement
that has contributed to the understanding that the law is not merely an
225
instrument for protecting private interests but is also an instrument
that can provide access to works that will benefit developing
communities around the globe. The law matters because it serves to
foster larger social goals through the grant of private property rights.
By encouraging private firms to produce literary and artistic works

222. Ghosh, supra note 182, at 500. “Copyright . . . diverges from real property in terms
of the ends it is designed to achieve. . . . [C]opyright serves as a means of privatizing
government functions of cultural production.” Id.
223. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257
(2007) (identifying the benefits of positive externalities or spillovers that benefit society as a
whole).
224. The World Intellectual Property Organization’s Development Agenda identifies
the digital divide and knowledge gap as separating the wealthy nations from the poor. See
Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO,
WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/document/
govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf.
225. See Access to Knowledge Movement, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Access_to_knowledge (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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through property rights, larger social goals will be fulfilled. Ultimately,
copyright’s empire is not about how far property rights should extend,
but rather how to encourage and support the proper conditions for
authorship to flourish.
Copyright’s empire is not as much about entitlement as it is about
values. The law matters because without the proper balance between
private and public interests, society’s needs cannot be met. Copyright’s
empire is about two things: authorship and society. There must be
proper conditions that will encourage authors to produce literary and
artistic works. Without rights provided by the law, authorship will not
flourish. The connections authors make with their consumers to
provide works that society values will not happen without a marketbased system of resource allocation. Importantly, literary and artistic
works are also the main sources for education and growth necessary in
order for society to develop. Without these works, society will reach a
standstill in the process of development. Society will stagnate the
moment the production of literary and artistic works ceases. The law
must ensure that society continues to have materials to develop. This
can only be done through a system connected to society via free market
supply and demand mechanics.
Ultimately, copyright’s empire is vast. It begins with the recognition
that private rights are important, and it ends with the acceptance that
society’s goals are indefinite. Only through rights protected by law can
we meet the goals defined by society.

